UCSB  LIBRARY 


REMARKS 


3IR.  PORTER,  OF  LOUISIANA, 


THE    REMOVAL   OF  THE  DEPOSITES 


DELIVERED 


IN  THE  SENATE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 


25,  1834. 


WASHINGTON : 

PRINTED  BY  GALES  AND  SEATON. 
1834. 


REMARKS. 


Mr.  PORTER  addressed  the  Senate  as  follows : 

I  do  not  wish,  Mr.  President,  to  take  any  part  in  the  contest  between- 
the  two  Senators  from  North  Carolina,  in  which  we  have  witnessed  so 
much  sharp  shooting;  and  I  hope,  at  all  events,  not  to  draw  on  me  the 
fire  of  the  honorable  Senator  from  Georgia,  (Mr.  FORSWH,)  who,  with 
a  skill  and  fertility  which  have  excited  my  surprise  and  admiration,  has, 
for  the  last  eight  weeks,  found  topics  of  consolation  for  all  the  variety  of 
distress  which  has  sought  relief  here,  and,  at  the  same  time,  has  mixed 
with  that  consolation  something  very  different  indeed  for  those  who  have, 
on  this  floor,  been  the  medium  by  which  the  sufferings  of  the  people 
have  reached  this  body. 

The  principal  reason  I  have  for  addressing  the  Senate  is  to  inform  it 
of  such  facts  as  have  come  to  my  knowledge  in  regard  to  the  people  of 
Louisiana,  so  far  as  their  condition  has  been  affected  by  the  late  acts  of 
the  General  Government  in  relation  to  the  public  deposites.     As,  how- 
ever, the  discussions  which  have  arisen  here  each  day,  for  the  space  of  near- 
ly two  months,  on  the  presentation  of  memorials,  may  be  properly  regarded 
as  rather  a  debate  on  the  state  of  the  Union,  than  on  the  mere  topics- 
connected  with  these  memorials,  1  trust  I  shall  be  pardoned  if  I  look  a 
little  beyond  the  mere  facts,  and  give  some  of  my  attention  to  the  causes 
of  the  disease,  and  to  the  remedies  by  which  it  may  be  alleviated. 

While,  however,  on  the  threshold  of  this  subject,  and  before  I  enter 
into  it,  I  must  disclaim  all  intentions  of  treating  this  as  a  party  question  r 
I  have  heard  it  repeatedly  said  it  was  one  of  that  kind,  and  I  am  afraid 
it  is  so  regarded  by  many.  I  deplore  such  a  state  of  things,  for  it  is 
unfavorable  to  the  investigation  of  truth.  The  question,  too,  involves 
considerations  far  above  the  interests  of  political  aspirants — it  is  of  a 
deeper  and  much  more  serious  character,  it  touches  the  fortunes  antf 
happiness  of  millions ;  and  the  American  people,  I  am  sure,  will  not 
permit  that  a  matter  of  such  vital  importance  to  their  interests  shall  be 
debated  and  adjudged  on  party  grounds.  If  they  ever  become  impress- 
ed with  the  conviction  that  it  is  so,  it  will  rouse  to  madness  feeling* 
now  repressed  by  a  hope  that  their  sufferings  will  receive  a  dispassionate 
examination.  If,  therefore,  any  thing  which  has  heretofore  transpired 
on  this  floor  gives  color  to  the  assertion  that  this  is  to  be  made  a  party 
question,  I  hope  that  the  future  course  of  our  deliberations  will  show  it 
to  be  a  mistake.  A  gentleman  of  this  body  quoted  to  me  the  other  day, 
in  conversation,  a  remark  of  one  of  the  most  sagacious  statesmen  or 
Great  Britain,  and,  at  the  same  time,  one  of  the  strongest  party-men  of 
his  day,  that  "  money  was  neither  Whig  nor  Tory."  So  should  it  be 
here,  neither  Jackson  nor  anti-Jackson.  More  especially  should  such 
a  doctrine  be  repudiated  when  great  public  distress  exists,  and  when  the 


protection  of  the   capital  and  industry  of  the   country  depends  on  the 
soundness  of  our  decision. 

Akin  to  this  objection,  which  relates  to  party,  we  have  been  told  by 
the  honorable  Senator  from  Georgia  that  our  real  cause  of  complaint, 
after  all,  was  the  popularity  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  Sir, 
I  have  not  heard  any  such  complaint  on  this  floor,  but,  if  it  had  been 
made,  I  am  not  sure  that  it  may  not  be  a  grievance  of  which  we  may 
complain.  A  certain  degree  of  popularity  is  required  in  every  Presi- 
dent, in  order  that  he  may  be  able  to  carry  into  effect  those  measures 
which  are  necessary  for  the  public  weal;  but  an  inordinate  popularity, 
which  stifles  inquiry  and  obscures  a  search  after  truth,  is  justly  to  be 
deprecated,  and  when  carried  so  far  as  to  defeat  legislation  called  for  by 
the  people,  it  becomes  a  serious  matter  for  complaint.  The  taunt,  there- 
fore, of  the  honorable  member  from  Georgia  might  have  been  spared, 
unless  he  was  prepared  to  show  that  the  acts,  which  the  popularity  of 
the  President  obstructed,  were  unwise  and  hurtful.  He  has  not  done 
so,  and  he  is  not,  I  presume,  to  be  understood  to  say  that  popularity  in 
itself  is  a  thing  to  be  admired  and  respected.  In  my  estimation  it  proves 
nothing  as  to  the  merits  of  the  possessor,  if  the  power  it  confers  be  not 
used  for  sage  and  beneficent  purposes. 

But,  sir,  I  go  further ;  and  I  say  that,  not  only  may  the  popularity  of  a  Pi  e- 
sident,when  used  in  a  certain  manner,  be  a  just  cause  of  complaint,  but, 
in  my  judgment,  it  is  a  great,  a  very  great  misfortune  for  any  people  to 
have  at  the  head  of  their  Government  an  extremely  popular  man  ;  be- 
cause it  is  a  necessary  consequence  of  such  a  popularity,  in  a  free  coun- 
try, that  there  exists  no  adequate  check  on  the  errors  of  his  administra- 
tion. I  make  this  observation,  not  merely  in  relation  to  the  present  Pre- 
sident of  the  United  States ;  it  wrould  be  equally  true,  and  as  readily  said 
by  me  of  any  other  individual  who  might  fill  the  office,  if  he  exercised 
the  same  influence  the  present  incumbent  does  over  the  public  mind.  It 
is  impossible  that  any  man  can  fill  the  Presidential  chair,  and  have  to 
deal  with  all  the  delicate  and  embarrassing  questions  which  grow  out  of 
the  conflicting  interests  of  the  different  portions  of  this  vast  republic,  and 
not  commit  errors.  The  constitution  and  the  laws  presume  he  will  fall 
into  them.  They  have  aided  him  by  constitutional  advisers ;  and  they  have 
appointed  to  him  constitutional  checks.  Well,  sir,  how  stands  the  case 
with  the  present  Chief  Magistrate  ?  I  suppose  it  is  not  offensive  to  say 
that  he  is  but  a  man,  and  that  he  may  have  committed  errors  since  he 
was  elected.  Nay,  that  in  all  the  matters  which  have  come  before 
him,  it  would  be  more  than  a  miracle  if  he  had  not  committed  many. 
And  yet  such  is  the  effect  of  his  popularity,  that  it  is  generally  believed 
he  has  committed  none.  Whatever  he  has  done  has  been  right,  and,  had 
it  been  otherwise,  I  have  no  doubt  that,  on  the  same  principle,  the  sound 
staunch  men  of  the  party  would  also  have  said  it  was  right — ay,  too,  and 
would  have  induced  the  people  to  think  it  was  right.  There  is  no  action 
performed  by  him,  since  he  came  into  power,  which  has  not  been  defend- 
ed—justified— applauded.  Whenever  "he  has  taken  the  responsibility," 
the  people  have  followed  in  his  train,  until  things  have  come  to  such  a 
pass,  that  he  is  spoken  of  as  the  head  of  the  Government  of  another  coun- 
try is  spoken  of — he  can  do  no  wrong ! 

Do  not  the  facts  belonging  to  the  question  we  are  now  debating  prove 


beyond  doubt  the  truth  of  these  views  ?  Is  there  a  man  on  this  floor  who 
has  said,  or  will  say,  that  he  would  have  given  advice  to  the  President 
to  remove  the  deposites  ?  Is  there  any  one  who  does  not  believe  that  it 
would  have  been  better  to  have  delayed  taking  so  important  a  step  until 
Congress  could  meet  ?  I  doubt  if  such  a  man  can  be  found  ;  at  least  / 
have  met  with  no  one,  since  my  arrival  here,  who  considers  the  measure, 
under  all  its  circumstances,  correct.  And  yet,  because  it  has  been  done 
by  Andrew  Jackson,  it  is  a  measure  of  wisdom,  of  prudence,  and  of  great 
public  utility.  The  war  cry  of  party  is  raised ;  and  virtuous  men,  who, 
apart  from  its  influence,  would  not  hesitate  to  acknowledge  the  error,  nor 
fail  to  correct  it,  are  drawn  by  their  feelings  10  seek  a  justification  for  it.. 
That  justification  cannot  be  found,  for  it  does  not  exist ;  but,  in  lieu  of  it, 
we  are  called  upon  here  to  witness,  day  after  day,  the  best  efforts  which 
vigorous  minds  can  make  to  obscure  the  true  question,  and  draw  public 
attention  from  the  real  point  in  dispute.  Nay,  on  this  floor,  the  act  is 
lauded — it  is  one  of  Roman  virtue  and  of  Roman  wisdom  ! ! !  And,  worse 
than  all,  the  language  of  reproach  is  resorted  to,  and  men  are  denounced 
because  they  call  in  question  its  wisdom  and  its  justice.  I  leave  it  to 
gentlemen  to  reflect  whether  this  be  a  healthy  state  of  public  feeling.  I 
put  it  to  them  to  consider  if  it  be  consistent  with  public  utility  that  such 
idolatry  should  be  displayed  in  regard  to  any  individual,  and  whether  it 
be  safe  to  habituate  the  people  to  pass  by  Congress,  and  look  to  the  Pre- 
sident as  the  source  from  which  all  legislation  should  flow.  If  they  think 
so,  why  then  they  are  right  to  sustain  even  this  act ;  but,  if  they  think 
with  me,  that  it  is  better  to  acknowledge  the  President  is  but  a  man,  and 
that  he  may  err,  no  fitter  occasion  can  arise  than  the  present,  to  make  an 
oblation  of  party  feeling  to  the  best  interests  of  the  republic. 

In  giving  to  the  Senate  such  facts  as  have  come  to  my  knowledge, 
touching  the  influence  which  the  late  measures  of  the  President  and  his 
Secretary  have  had  on  the  money  market  in  our  State,  and  the  price  of 
our  staple  productions,  sugar  and  cotton,  it  becomes  my  duty  to  frankly 
state  that  I  am  greatly  surprised  that  our  section  of  the  republic  should 
have  suffered  so  much  as  my  advices  assure  me  it  has.  The  Senate,  too, 
I  am  certain,  will  share  in  my  surprise,  when  I  state  that  the  nominal 
banking  capital  of  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  independent  of  that  employ- 
ed there  by  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  is  twenty-seven  and  a  half 
millions  of  dollars  ;  that,  of  this  immense  amount,  all  has  been  paid  in, 
as  the  phrase  is,  save  perhaps  three  millions  of  dollars.  The  far  greater 
part  of  this  capital,  I  might  perhaps  say  all,  has  not  been  formed  by  a 
practice,  I  am  told  common  elsewhere,  of  paying  the  first  instalment  so 
as  to  enable  the  bank  to  commence  its  operations,  and  then  borrowing 
on  the  accommodations  the  institution  can  afford,  by  the  circulation  of  its 
paper,  to  pay  up  any  further  instalments  which  are  called  for.  On  the 
contrary,  the  capital  of  by  fa/  the  greater  portion  of  our  banks  has  been 
obtained  from  England  and  our  sister  States,  in  consequence  of  the  readi- 
ness, and  I  am  afraid  I  must  add  the  profusion,  with  which  our  Legisla- 
tures, for  several  years  past,  have  pledged  the  faith  of  the  State  for  the 
repayment  of  money  borrowed  for  such  purposes. 

Looking  on  such  a  state  of  things,  sir,  when  I  left  the  banks  of  the 
Mississippi,  about  two  months  ago,  I  did  think,  and  I  communicated  my 
opinion  to  several  of  my  commercial  friends,  that  the  pecuniary  pressure, 


which  we  understood  was  beginning  to  be  felt  to  the  north  and  east  of 
us,  would  not  reach  Louisiana.  Among  others,  to  whom,  in  the  inter- 
change of  opinion,  I  imparted  these  views,  wfas  a  gentleman  of  great 
experience  in  matters  of  currency,  who  told  me  I  was  mistaken  ;  that  the 
connexion  between  the  great  commercial  cities  of  this  continent,  in  rela- 
tion to  money,  was  so  intimate,  and  the  sympathy  between  them  so 
strong,  that  a  severe  blow  dealt  to  any  one  of  them  could  not  fail,  sooner 
or  Jater,  to  reach  all  the  rest.  Sir,  keeping  my  eye  on  the  value  of  our 
products,  and  the  enormous  amount  of  our  banking  capital,  I  doubted  the 
correctness  of  this  opinion ;  but  the  event  has  shown  the  difference  be- 
tween the  experience  of  a  practical  man,  whose  life  has  been  devoted  to 
pursuits  connected  with  the  subject  under  consideration,  and  my  crude, 
theoretical  notions.  It  has  proved  that  I  was  wrong,  and  that  he  was 
right ;  and  that  the  shock  given  to  the  money  market,  at  New  York  and 
Philadelphia,  has  been  carried  to  New  Orleans,  in  obedience  to  laws  as 
invariable  in  their  operation  as  those  which  move  and  control  the  physical 
world. 

I  have  received  several  letters  from  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  of  recent 
date,  from  men  extensively  engaged  in  business,  well  acquainted  with 
the  state  of  the  money  market  there,  and  themselves  as  little  exposed  to 
the  danger  of  wanting  this  necessary  article  at  the  present  crisis,  as  any 
persons  within  the  range  of  my  acquaintance.  I  will  not  commonplace 
to  you,  sir,  on  their  respectability,  and  love  of  truth.  It  is  enough  for 
me  to  say  that  they  are  merchants  of  the  first  respectability  among  the 
merchants  of  New  Orleans — a  body  of  men,  who,  on  the  credit  of  an 
experience  acquired  during  fourteen  years  spent  in  judging  them  and 
their  transactions,  I  take  on  me  to  say,  are  excelled  by  no  others  on 
earth  of  similar  pursuits, — in  enterprise, — commercialknowledge, — a  clear- 
sighted view  of  their  interests  ; — and  a  wise  integrity  which  enables  them 
to  know  that  their  own  prosperity  is,  in  the  end,  best  promoted  by  doing 
justice  to  others.  They  write  me  under  date  from  the  15th  of  January 
to  the  1st  of  February,  that  paper  which,  when  I  left  the  city,  was  dis- 
counted at  rates  varying  from  eight  to  ten  per  cent.,  could  only  be 
cashed,  at  the  time  they  wrote,  at  fifteen  or  twenty  per  cent.  They 
take  the  liberty,  also,  sir,  to  express  their  opinions  as  to  the  cause  of  the 
unexpected  change  which  has  come  over  them  and  the  country ;  but  I 
shall  not  trouble  you  with  their  speculations,  much  as  they  are  entitled 
to  respect.  The  cause  of  the  suffering  which  now  pervades  society,  pre- 
sents ground  which  is  debatable.  But,  although  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
say  what  has  occasioned  the  present  pressure  in  the  money  market,  it  is 
quite  easy  to  say  that  one  thing  has  not  produced  it  in  New  Orleans. 
Sir,  I  feel  authorized  to  declare  that  the  present  scarcity  of  money  in 
that  city  is  not  owing  to  the  branch  of  the  United  States  Bank  establish- 
ed there.  And,  as  some  erroneous  impressions  have  been  conveyed  to 
the  Senate  on  this  matter,  I  seize  on  the  present  occasion  to  correct 
them.  Some  time  after  I  had  the  honor  to  take  my  seat  here,  the  honor- 
able Senator  from  Missouri  (Mr.  BENTON)  read  to  this  body  a  letter  re- 
ceived by  him  from  a  highly  respectable  source  in  our  city,  wherein  the 
pressure  was  attributed  to  the  conduct  of  the  Branch  Bank,  acting  under 
the  orders  of  the  parent  institution  at  Philadelphia.  Sir,  I  do  not  dis- 
guise from  you  that  this  intelligence  greatly  surprised  me,  and  I  did 


think  it  especially  strange  that,  if  such  was  the  fact,  myself  and  my  col- 
league were  to  learn  it  for  the  first  time  on  this  floor,  from  the  Senator  of 
^another  State.  Sir,  I  immediately  set  to  work,  with  the  diligence  of  a 
man  in  search  of  truth,  and  I  went  to  the  fountain  head  to  obtain  infor- 
mation. I  have  procured  it,  and  I  learn  from  what  I  get  there,  as  well  as 
from  other  sources,  that  710  blame  whatever  is  attributable  either  to  the 
mother  Bank  or  its  branch  in  New  Orleans.  The  statement  of  the  letter 
writer  alluded  to,  that  orders  had  been  sent  from  Philadelphia  to  New 
Orleans,  prohibiting  the  purchase  of  drafts  on  the  Western  country,  was 
entirely  gratuitous.  No  such  orders  were  sent.  Necessity,  indeed,  pro- 
duced by  the  removal  of  the  deposites,  and  the  threatening  attitude  assum- 
ed by  the  Executive,  prevented  the  purchase  of  western  exchange  to 
the  same  amount  as  formerly,  and  compelled  the  Bank  to  concentrate  its 
funds  in  the  principal  Atlantic  cities,  where  the  larger  proportion  of  mo- 
ney derived  from  duties  was  to  be  collected  and  placed  in  the  pet  banks, 
and  where,  of  course,  the  heaviest  demands  would  be  made  on  that  of 
the  United  States.  But  the  conduct  of  the  branch  located  in  our  city 
has,  under  the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  it  was  unexpectedly 
placed,  been  liberal  in  a  high  degree.  A  short  statement  of  their  business 
within  the  last  four  months  will  prove  this.  On  the  4th  November,  1833, 
their  notes  and  exchange,  under  discounts,  were  $6,110,577  57,  and  their 
public  deposites  at  that  time  were  $596,929  06.  On  the  3d  of  the 
next  month  their  balances  exhibited  the  same  relative  proportions.  But 
on  the  3d  of  February,  their  notes  under  discount  and  exchange  had 
increased  to  $8,759,518  45,  and  their  deposites  were  $150,116  25  ;  so 
that  in  ninety  days  preceding  the  3d  of  February,  the  Government  had 
deprived  the  Bank,  as  far  as  it  could,  of  all  means  of  accommodating  the 
trade  of  our  city  ;  it  had  withdrawn  four  hundred  and  forty-six  thousand 
dollars  of  the  deposites,  which  was  nearly  the  whole,  and  during  the 
same  time  the  Bank  had  extended  its  accommodations  to  the  public  to 
the  amount  of  two  million  six  hundred  and  forty-eight  thousand  nine 
hundred  and  forty  dollars  beyond  the  sum  lent  out  on  the  3d  of  November ; 
and  yet  the  conduct  of  the  Bank,  it  is  said,  during  this  period,  has  been 
the  cause  of  the  pressure  on  the  money  market  in  New  Orleans  !  Oh, 
fy  !  Sir,  the  charge  has  just  as  much  foundation  against  the  Bank  in  New 
Orleans  as  against  the  mother  Bank  and  its  branches  in  other  cities  of 
the  Union.  Whenever  we  go  into  particulars,  and  can  get  its  enemies 
and  accusers  to  descend  from  empty  generalities,  and  investigate  facts, 
the  utter  want  of  all  foundation  for  their  accusations  instantly  appears. 

While  on  this  subject  of  the  bank  in  our  city,  and  its  accommodations, 
I  cannot  help  lamenting  the  deplorable  inconvenience  to  which  the  mer- 
chants of  New  Orleans,  and  the  whole  commerce  of  the  Western 
States,  will  be  exposed,  by  the  breaking  up  of  an  institution  which  has  so 
much  facilitated  the  operations  of  trade,  by  the  purchase  of  internal  bills 
of  exchange.  The  Senate,  I  am  sure,  are  not  aware  to  what  extent  its 
usefulness  has  been  carried.  Through  all  the  States  to  the  West,  and 
particularly  those  of  the  Southwest,  a  large  proportion  of  the  planters 
and  farmers  require  advances  in  their  crops,  before  they  can  be  got  ready 
for  market.  The  merchants  in  those  regions  have  not  the  means  of  mak- 
ing their  advances,  if  unaided  by  a  bank  similar  to  that  of  the  United 
States.  But,  for  years  back,  the  funds  have  been  supplied  by  that  insti- 


tution  for  this  purpose.  Commercial  houses,  all  through  the  Western 
States,  having  credit,  and  doing  business  with  those  of  our  city,  have 
•drawn  late  in  the  summer,  or  early  in  the  autumn,  bills  of  exchange  on 
New  Orleans,  and  sold  them  to  the  branches  established  in,  their  respec- 
tive States.  With  the  money  drawn  from  this  source,  the  planter  and 
tin-  farmer  have  been  supplied,  and  the  extent  and  value  of  this  accom- 
modation can  only  be  judged  of  by  those  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
habits  and  wants  of  the  planting  portion  of  the  community.  Its  utility, 
however,  did  not  stop  here.  A  few  months  run  round,  the  crops  are  ga- 
thered, delivered  to  the  merchant,  and  transmitted  to  New  Orleans  for 
sale.  There  then  happens  what  might  be  expected  in  all  cases  where 
considerations  of  personal  advantage  enter  into  the  calculations  we  make 
of  the  future.  It  is  found  that  the  planter  has  estimated  too  largely  his 
crop ;  he  falls  in  debt  to  his  merchant,  and  he  in  return  has  a  balance 
against  him  in  the  city  where  the  produce  was  sold.  The  Bank  steps  in 
again,  and  purchases  from  the  factor  in  New  Orleans  a  draft  on  the 
house  in  the  Western  country,  and  in  that  way  enables  the  produce  of  a 
second  crop  to  be  got  to  market  before  payment  is  really  demanded. 
What  I  now  state  has  been  every  year's  transactions  for  several  years 
back  ;  and  I  confess  I  see  no  means  of  supplying  such  an  accommodation 
through  State  banks.  Indeed,  in  the  matter  of  exchange,  and  all  other 
matters  connected  with  the  whole  trade  of  the  Western  country,  the  ad- 
vantages conferred  by  the  institution  which  it  is  now  wantonly  attempted 
to  destroy,  have  been  immense.  I  declare,  solemnly,  that  as  much  to  it, 
as  to  any  other  cause,  do  I  attribute  the  development  of  the  resources  of 
the  Western  country.  Without  it,  the  delightful  results  of  industry,  stimu- 
lated by  capital,  would  not  have  shown  themselves  in  the  subdued  forests, 
cultivated  fields,  and  growing  cities  of  the  West ;  nor  would  crowds  of 
steamboats  have  now  covered  her  waters. 

I  have  stated,  sir,  that  I  did  not  believe  the  State  banks  could  supply 
the  vacuum  which  would  be  created  by  the  withdrawal  of  the  capital.  I 
go  further,  and  say,  that,  were  that  capital  divided  among  them,  I  do 
not  think  they  could  wield  it  to  the  same  advantage  for  the  community, 
more  especially  in  this  matter  of  exchange.  Confidence  can  never  exist 
between  independent  institutions  to  such  a  degree  as  to  enable  them 
to  carry  on  the  purchase  of  bills  of  exchange  to  the  same  extent  as  one 
institution,  possessed  of  the  capital  of  all,  can,  through  her  respective 
branches.  As  soon,  too,  as  the  great  regulator  and  controller  of  the  State 
institutions,  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  is  withdrawn,  the  same  scenes 
will  be  rapidly  presented  to  our  eyes  as  met  them  after  the  destruction  of 
the  first  National  Bank.  The  respective  States  will  augment  the  number 
of  local  institutions.  Competition,  and  the  desire  to  make  large  dividends, 
will  stimulate  them  all  to  issue  as  much  paper  as  they  can.  It  will,  of 
course,  inevitably  depreciate  in  value.  Mutual  distrust  will  take  place. 
They  will  fear  to  credit  each  other ;  and  finally  it  will  be  impossible  to 
transfer  money  from  one  part  of  the  Union  to  the  other,  without  great  in- 
convenience and  expense. 

I  pass,  sir,  from  the  considerations  which  grow  out  of  the  condition  of 
the  money  market  in  Louisiana,  to  the  situation  of  the  planters  under  the 
late  derangement  in  our  currency.  The  Senators  from  Mississippi  and 
South  Carolina  (Messrs.  POINDEXTER  and  PRESTON)  stated,  in  an  early 


9 

part  of  this  session,  that  the  price  of  cotton  in  the  Southern  States  was  not 
within  two  or  three  cents  of  the  price  which  it  should  bring  in  reference 
to  its  value  at  the  port  of  Liverpool,  and  they  argued,  and,  as  I  thought, 
very  satisfactorily,  that  such  a  difference  could  alone  proceed  from  a  want 
of  money  in  the  United  States.  This  position  has  been  assailed  by  the 
Senator  from  Georgia,  (Mr.  KING,)  who  addressed  this  body  a  few  days 
since  for  the  first  time,  and  with  a  clearness  which  I  am  much*  more  ca- 
pable of  admiring  than  of  imitating.  He  considered  the  idea  as  wholly 
fallacious,  that,  if  cotton  was  below  its  real  value,  money  would  instantly 
seek  it  as  a  profitable  investment,  and  that  the  competition  thus  procured 
for  it  would  raise  the  article  to  its  true  price.  Sir,  I  differ  in  opinion 
with  the  honorable  Senator.  As  a  general  rule,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  low  prices  invite  purchasers,  and  that  the  number  who  seek  to  profit 
by  such  a  state  of  things  soon  raises  the  objects  offered  for  sale  to  their 
true  value.  And  this  is  a  consequence  of  a  universal  law,  by  which  money, 
like  the  fluids,  has  a  tendency  to  find  its  level.  But  the  honorable 
Senator  overlooked  the  fact  that  it  takes  money  some  time  to  find  the 
level.  The  State  of  Louisiana  bears  very  full  testimony  to  the  truth  of 
this  position.  For  the  last  twenty  years,  and  upwards,  we  have  been 
paying  interest  at  the  rate  of  ten  per  cent,  per  annum,  while,  in  the 
Northern  States,  money,  during  the  same  time,  was  not  worth  more  than 
five  or  six  per  cent.  Many  causes  check  and  prevent  the  operation  of 
the  law  alluded  to.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  them.  The  fact  is  in- 
disputable. And  the  argument  of  the  honorable  Senator  by  no  means 
affects  the  correctness  of  the  assertion,  that  cotton  may  be  of  less  value 
here  than  it  should  be,  when  compared  with  the  price  at  the  place  of  con- 
sumption. I  am  free  indeed  to  admit  that  such  a  state  of  things  cannot 
be  of  long  duration,  and  that  very  soon,  if  indeed  the  market  has  not  al- 
ready come  to  that  state,  prices  must  be  at  their  true  proportion.  But  in 
the  mean  time  great  mischief  is  done.  The  planter  in  many,  I  am  afraid 
too  many,  instances  has  not  been  able  to  wait  this  change  in  price.  He 
has  been  compelled  to  sell,  and  the  difference  in  value  has  become  profit 
to  the  rich  capitalist.  The  agriculturist,  as  usual,  has  been  the  victim. 
This  loss,  it  is  clear,  is  solely  due  to  the  unwise  and  unfortunate  act  of  the 
Secretary,  removing  the  deposites,  and  thereby  deranging  the  currency  of 
the  country. 

But  whether  correct  or  not  in  these  remarks,  I  apprehend  there  will 
be  little  controversy  in  relation  to  those  I  may  make  on  the  other  grand 
staple  of  our  State,  sugar.  It  is  known  to  the  Senate  that  the  cane  from 
which  the  article  is  manufactured  is  the  production  of  the  tropical  re- 
gions, and  that  it  is  with  much  difficulty,  and  great  hazard  of  loss,  that 
its  cultivation  is  pursued  in  the  most  favored  portions  of  the  United  States. 
The  last  season  we  were  visited  by  a  frost,  unexampled  for  its  severity 
at  so  early  a  period  of  the  autumn.  From  this  and  other  causes,  which 
need  not  be  enumerated,  the  crop  of  sugar  was  reduced  to  a  little  more 
than  half  what  would  have  been  the  result  in  a  favorable  year.  Disas- 
trous as  this  blow  was,  falling  after  two  previous  years  of  bad  crops,  we 
had  a  consolation  in  the  news  which  flowed  in  upon  us  from  all  quarters, 
that  the  price  would  be  high.  We  learned  that  the  quantity  produced  in 
the  West  Indies  was  much  less  than  usual,  and  that  the  market  to  the 
North  was  never  known  more  completely  bare  of  the  article  than  it  was 
2 


10 

at  the  beginning  of  the  present  winter.  And  yet,  sir,  what  is  now  the  fact, 
as  it  relates  to  prices  under  the  operation  of  the  late  Executive  measures  ? 
Why,  this  :  that  with  a  foreign  supply,  less  than  has  been  known  for  years  ; 
with  a  domestic  production  not  adequate  to  meet  the  demands  of  the  mar- 
ket in  an  ordinary  year,  we  cannot  sell.  My  merchants  write  me,  that, 
such  is  the  depression  of  the  money  market,  they  cannot  dispose  of  a 
quantity  .of  sugar  as  formerly.  That  the  grocers  who,  in  other  times, 
purchased  40  or  50  hogsheads  at  once,  now  content  themselves  with  five 
or  six.  That  the  consumption  was  diminished,  and  likely  to  be  still  fur- 
ther diminished,  as  the  working  classes  were  thrown  out  of  employment, 
and  their  comforts  abridged.  And,  sir,  when  they  do  sell  a  few  hogs- 
heads, they  accompany  the  account  with  a  declaration  that,  wrere  it  not 
for  the  deranged  state  of  the  currency,  the  article  would  bring  a  cent 
to  a  cent  and  a  half  per  pound  more  than  it  is  now  selling  for.  The  cor- 
rectness of  this  statement  I  cannot  doubt,  for  I  see  the  same  effect,  or 
nearly  the  same,  produced  on  all  commodities.  So  that  the  Louisiana 
planter  this  year  must  pay  a  tax  of  from  ten  to  fifteen  dollars  on  each 
hogshead  of  sugar,  in  order  that  an  experiment  may  be  made  by  the  Se- 
cretary of  the  Treasury.  It  is  really  difficult  for  one,  thus  contemplating 
the  injury  wantonly  and  unnecessarily  inflicted  on  the  people  he  repre- 
sents, to  measure  his  expressions  of  disapprobation,  so  as  to  render  them 
befitting  the  calmness  and  the  dignity  of  this  high  assembly.  Had  this 
misfortune  fallen  on  the  country  by  the  act  of  God,  or  by  foreign  war,  or 
by  any  thing  else  that  was  inevitable,  the  people  of  Louisiana  would  have 
met  it  with  the  same  energy  they  once  exhibited,  when,  under  the  gal- 
lant auspices  of  the  individual  now  at  the  head  of  the  Government,  they 
rushed  to  battle,  and  aided  him  to  drive  the  enemy  from  their  shores. 
But  to  see  their  prosperity  interrupted,  and  the  fruits  of  their  labor  dimi- 
nished in  value,  without  any  adequate  cause  for  the  infliction  of  the  injury, 
is  too  much  for  human  patience. 

And,  sir,  I  feel  the  difficulty  of  treating  the  subject  calmly  greatly  in- 
creased, when  I  hear  it  said  on  this  floor,  to  weaken  the  influence  which 
the  cry  of  suffering  from  the  people  must  have  on  our  measures,  that  the 
distress  is  but  temporary,  and  that  the  accounts  of  it  are  exaggerated  from 
motives  of  political  opposition,  and  for  political  effect.  It  is  no  doubt  true, 
sir,  the  distress  is  but  temporary  ;  that  is,  there  will  be  an  end  to  it  some 
time  ;  but  what  consolation  that  reflexion  can  bring,  when  its  effects  are 
permanent,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  conjecture.  It  is  a  poor  comfort,  it  is  worse. 
It  is  cruel  mockery  to  the  trader,  merchant,  or  manufacturer,  who  is  made 
bankrupt  by  Government  experiments,  to  be  told  that  he  should  not  be 
distressed ;  for  that,  although  he  is  ruined  in  credit  and  hopes  for  the 
rest  of  his  life,  the  republic  will  survive  the  disaster,  and  flourish  again. 
Still  less  do  such  observations  give  consolation  to  the  artificer,  or  laborer, 
who  is  thrown  out  of  employment,  deprived  of  the  means  of  earning  his 
daily  food  and  that  of  his  family,  and  compelled  to  ask  from  charity  what 
he  formerly  obtained  from  industry.  And  as  to  political  opposition  caus- 
ing these  memorials  to  pour  in  upon  us,  day  after  day,  in  such  numbers 
as  to  deprive  us  of  the  time  necessary  for  the  ordinary  duties  of  legisla- 
lation,  I  apprehend  it  is  a  great  mistake  to  suppose  they  spring  from  any 
such  source.  That  political  feeling  may  mingle  with  them  in  some 
degree,  is  perhaps  true  ;  but  that  it  is  the  cause  of  them,  I  utterly  deny. 
To  imagine  so,  is  to  take  the  curl  produced  on  the  surface  of  the  sea  by 


the  wind  as  an  indication  of  its  movement,  while  it  is  the  tide,  by  an 
irresistible  impulse,  which  carries  the  ocean  to  its  limits.  No,  sir,  politi- 
cal disappointment,  nor  the  desire  of  political  effect,  never  could  have 
thus  heaved  up  the  elements  of  society,  and  thrown  them  before  us,  pray- 
ing for  a  hearing,  and  supplicating  for  redress.  Political  feeling  can  do 
much  ;  it  sometimes  deceives  the  head,  and  often  influences  the  heart  ; 
but  it  has  little  effect  on  the  pocket;  and  when  men  find  their  purses 
emptied  by  State  empirics,  you  may  confide  in  the  perfect  sincerity  of 
their  complaints,  and  you  have  no  occasion  to  look  beyond  that  state  of 
things  for  the  motives  which  urge  them  to  present  their  grievances  to 
your  consideration. 

Having  now,  sir,  accomplished  the  main  object  I  had  in  view  in  ob- 
taining the  floor,  I  might,  perhaps,  with  propriety,  close  my  remarks. 
But  as,  in  the  present  condition  of  our  affairs,  the  opinions  of  every  man 
who  has  a  share  in  the  national  councils  is  of  importance,  though  his 
place  there  may  be  the  only  circumstance  which  makes  them  so,  I  think 
it  proper  to  state  some  conclusions  I  have  formed  on  the  matters  which 
now  agitate  the  country.  And  first,  then,  sir,  as  to  the  cause  of  the  pre- 
sent embarrassment.  My  convictions  are  very  decided,  that  it  is  due  to 
the  removal  of  the  deposites  from  the  Bank  of  the  United  States.  It  seems 
to  have  puzzled  gentlemen  on  this  floor,  and  elsewhere,  how  the  change 
of  a  sum  of  money  from  one  banking  house  to  another  could  occasion 
any  distress  to  the  public.  I  do  not  know  that  I  am  correct  in  my  views 
of  the  matter,  but  it  does  not  seem  to  be  very  difficult  to  explain  the 
modus  operandi.  Credit  rests  entirely  on  the  opinion  entertained  of 
safety.  And  that  opinion  once  shaken,  whether  on  good  grounds  or  bad, 
all  the  evils  which  grow  out  of  panic  flow  in  upon  society  nearly  as  rapidly 
as  if  the  danger  was  real.  It  is  clear  to  me  at  least,  that,  had  the  con- 
duct of  the  United  States  Bank  been  what  it  might,  a  momentary  pres- 
sure must  have  existed  in  the  money  market,  and  that,  if  that  pressure 
produced  general  alarm,  it  was  a  consequence  that  the  pressure  should 
continue  much  longer  than  the  original  cause  subsisted.  When  the  State 
banks,  and  the  mercantile  and  trading  portion  of  the  people,  saw  such  an 
unexpected  and  heavy  blow  dealt  by  the  President  of  the  United  States 
against  the  National  Bank,  it  was  impossible  they  should  not  be  alarmed  ; 
for  they  could  neither  tell  how  it  would  affect  the  Bank,  or  how  that  in- 
stitution, on  being  so  struck,  would  feel  compelled  to  act  during  the  un- 
expired  term  of  its  charter.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  declared 
that  it  was  high  time  it  should  begin  to  curtail  its  discounts,  and  commence 
the  settlement  of  its  affairs.  And  the  subordinate  agents  boasted  that 
they  had  the  institution  under  their  feet.  Such  a  state  of  things  immedi- 
ately filled  all  the  local  institutions,  and  all  men  of  prudence,  with  the  fear 
of  an  approaching  storm.  That  fear  in  itself  was  sufficient  to  produce  the 
evil  that  was  dreaded  ;  for  it  made  men  distrustful  of  one  another.  That 
distrust  showed  itself  in  diminished  discounts  in  the  State  banks,  fewer 
sales  than  usual,  and  more  caution  in  giving  endorsements.  The  usual 
consequences  have  followed  such  a  state  of  things.  The  feeble  in  wealth 
and  credit  have  sunk  first,  and  their  misfortunes  have  caused  more  to  be 
apprehended.  Banks,  private  citizens,  and  all  who  have  capital,  become 
more  and  more  alarmed  every  day,  and  the  evil  keeps  augmenting.  When 
such  a  state  of  things  occurs,  it  is  a  necessary  consequence  that  the  evil 


If 

must  progress,  unless  the  banks  can  come  to  the  relief  of  the  community, 
by  an  accommodation  beyond  that  given  before  the  alarm  began.  It  is 
they  who  must  set  the  example  in  restoring  confidence.  Private  capital- 
ists will  follow,  but  not  lead,  in  such  a  measure.  There  was  a  time 
when  the  National  Bank,  from  its  great  resources,  and  its  connexion  writh 
the  Government,  had  in  some  measure  the  responsibility  of  preventing, 
if  possible,  such  a  panic,  and  of  relieving  it,  if  it  did  occur.  But  that 
duty  and  that  power  have  both  ceased,  and  there  is  no  prospect  of  the 
country  being  relieved.  The  distress  must  increase  too,  so  soon  as  the 
curtailments  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  commence  ;  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Treasury  has  told  the  Bank  that  this  curtailment  has  been 
delayed  too  long,  and  that  it  is  necessary  to  the  best  interests  of  society 
it  should  have  commenced  ere  this,  in  order  that  the  State  bank  paper 
might  come  gradually  into  use. 

Never,  in  my  judgment,  was  a  more  unwise  measure  resorted  to  in 
any  country  than  that  of  removing  the  deposites.  Time,  which  enters 
more  or  less  into  the  considerations  on  which  the  propriety  or  fitness  of 
all  measures  depends,  was  wholly  disregarded.  Any  man,  whether  states- 
man or  not,  could  have  seen  that  it  was  an  unpropitious  moment ;  that 
there  was  so  much  trade,  there  might  almost  be  said  to  be  overtrading  ; 
and  that  credit,  through  the  whole  extent  of  the  country,  was  pushed  to 
its  utmost  extent.  Senators  say,  indeed,  that  had  the  deposites  been  re- 
moved at  any  time,  the  same  evil  consequence  would  have  followed.  I 
enter,  sir,  my  utter  dissent  to  such  a  proposition.  Had  it  been  deferred 
until  the  termination  of  the  charter,  as  was  the  case  with  the  old  United 
States  Bank,  men  wrould  have  had  time  to  regulate  their  engagements,  to 
meet  the  change.  Foreseeing  that  when  the  Bank  closed  its  affairs,  a 
shock  would  be  given  to  the  monetary  system,  preparations  would  have 
been  made  to  meet  it.  The  State  banks,  too,  would  have  been  more 
able  to  give  relief,  because  the  large  capital  of  the  National  Bank  would, 
at  that  time,  be  ready  to  flow  into  other  channels.  But  now,  with  a  fa- 
tuity of  which  there  is  no  example,  we  have  given  a  shock  to  credit  and 
confidence,  when  for  two  years  to  come,  and  more,  the  capital  of  the  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  or  the  larger  proportion  of  it,  will  be  withdrawn 
from  circulation,  while  that  institution  is  winding  up  its  affairs.  We  have 
done  so,  sir,  without  having  any  substitute  prepared,  in  place  of  the  ca- 
pital thus  taken  out.  The  State  banks,  it  is  clear,  cannot  furnish  it. 
They  complain  of  pressure  now,  when  there  has  occurred  nothing  to  oc- 
casion it,  save  the  want  of  confidence.  What  their  situation  will  be  when 
the  United  States  Bank  commences  its  curtailments,  need  not  be  said. 
The  pressure  on  them  will  augment,  and,  with  it,  their  incapacity  to  af- 
ford any  relief.  Sir,  I  see  no  end  to  this  confusion  and  distress,  unless 
the  people  of  the  United  States  speak  a  language  to  their  rulers  that 
cannot  be  disregarded. 

I  hold,  then,  sir,  that  the  removal  of  the  deposites  was  a  sufficient 
cause  to  produce  the  present  calamitous  state  of  our  affairs.  If  it  was 
not,  I  call  on  honorable  Senators  to  say  what  does  occasion  it  ?  We 
have  been  told  it  is  caused  by  the  Bank  of  the  United  States :  but 
if  it  is,  gentlemen  can  surely  show  how  the  Bank  has  caused  it.  This  is 
an  interrogatory  which  has  been  put  again  and  again  on  this  floor ;  and 
to  which  no  answer  has  been  given,  save  that  the  Bank  is  very  powerful, 


13 

very  corrupt,  and  is  using  all  its  means  to  oppress  the  public,  and  force  a 
recharter  from  Congress.     These   are  just  as  easily  said,  as  any  other 
similar  number  of  English  words  ;  and,  without  proof  in  support  of  them, 
they  are  of  no  more  assistance  in  deciding  the  question,  than  the  same 
number  of  words  on  any  other  subject  would  be.  The  Bank,  however,  does 
not  rest  hei  defence  on  the  want  of  proof  on  the  part  of  her  accusers.     She 
shows  beyond  doubt,  on  the  most  irrefragable  evidence,  that  it  is  not 
owing  to  her  action.      The  official  returns  establish  that  the  curtailment 
of  her  discounts  has  not  exceeded  the  sum  of  money  withdrawn  by  the 
Government  from  her  vaults.     The  clamor  against  her,  then,  is  without 
any  foundation.     A  new  version  has  indeed  been  given  of  the  complaint 
against  the  Bank, by  an  honorable  Senator  from  Maine,  (Mr.  SHEPLEY.) 
According  to  him,  the  Bank  might  relieve  the  public  distress,  if  it  would  only 
issue  about  fifteen  millions  of  bank  notes.    This  is  a  very  compendious  way 
of  settling  the  question.     But  has  the  honorable  Senator  any  information 
which  enables  him  to  say  that  the  Bank  could  issue  such  a  sum  safely  ? 
Nay,  that  it  could  issue  one  million  more,  at  the  present  crisis,  than  it  has 
now  in  circulation  ?     If  he  has,  it  is  a  knowledge  not  possessed  by  me, 
nor  do  I  believe  by  any  other  member  of  this  body.     The  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Senator  from  Maine,  however,  forms  a  curious  contrast  with 
the  mandates  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  last  October.     According 
to  the  Senator,  the  Bank  should  extend  its  discounts  at  the  present  time. 
According  to  the  Secretary,  it  should  not  have  delayed  their  curtailment 
beyond  the  1st  of  October  last.     According  to  the  Senator,  it  is  an  evil  that 
there  is  not  more  United  States  Bank  paper  in  circulation.     According  to 
the  Secretary,  there  was  too  much  of  it  out  three  months  ago,  and  it  was 
then  absolutely  necessary  for  the  Bank  to  call  it  in.     Sir,  it  is  not  unin- 
structive  to  recur  to  the  language  used  by  that  high  functionary  some 
months  ago.     It  will  serve,  I  trust,  as  a  warning,  hereafter,  for  men  not  to 
tamper  with  the  currency  of  the  country.     In  his  letter  of  the  3d  of  De- 
cember, transmitting  a  report  on  the  removal  of  the  public  deposites,  he 
says,  "the  State  banks  can,  I  have  no  doubt,  furnish  a  general  circulating 
medium  quite  as  uniform  in  value  as  that  which  has  been  furnished  by  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States — perhaps  more."    He  continues:  "But  a  cur- 
rency founded  on  the  notes  of  State  banks  could  not  be  suddenly  substi- 
tuted for  that  heretofore  furnished  by  the  Bank  of  the  United  States,  and 
take  the  place  of  it,  at  the  same   moment,  in  every  part  of  the  Union." 
He  further  adds,  that  by  "  the  monthly  statement  of  the  Bank,  of  the  2d 
September  last,  the  notes  of  the  Bank  and  its  branches,  then  in  circula- 
tion, amounted  to  $18,413,287  07,  and  that  this  immense  amount  must 
all  be  withdrawn  from  circulation  when  the  charter  expires."     Having 
got  these  ideas  well  fixed  in  his  mind,  viz.  that  the  notes  of  the  State  banks 
would  furnish  a  good,  and  perhaps  better  currency  than  the  United  States 
Bank  notes,  that  there  were  a  great  quantity  of  the  latter  in  circulation, 
and  that  they  must  be  withdrawn,  the  Secretary  discovers  that  the  notes 
of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  are  about  to  depreciate,  and  that  it  is  im- 
portant— mark  his  words — "  that  they  should  be  all  taken  out  of  circula- 
tion before  they  depreciate  in  the  hands  of  the  individuals  ivho  hold  them." 
This  alarming  conclusion  being  reached,  it  was  necessary  to  set  to  work 
immediately  to  avert  such  disastrous  consequences  from  the  community ; 
and,  accordingly,  this  officer,  in  the  report  already  quoted  from,  asks  "  how 


14 

long  it  will  require,  for  the  ordinary  operations  of  commerce,  and  the  re- 
duction of  discounts  by  the  Bank,  to  withdraw  the  amount  of  circula- 
tion before  mentioned,  without  giving  a  shock  to  the  currency,  or  producing 
a  distressing  pressure  on  the  community."  This  question  he  answers 
himself  in  the  next  sentence,  by  declaring  his  conviction  "  that  the  time 
which  remained  for  the  charter  to  run,  after  the  1st  of  October,  (the  day 
on  which  the  removal  of  the  deposites  took  place,)  was  not  more  than 
was  proper  to  accomplish  the  object  with  safety  to  the  community." 
Now,  sir,  I  admit  that  the  Bank  has  not  followed  these  instructions  ;  that 
she  did  not  begin  to  curtail  her  discounts  on  the  1  st  of  October ;  and  that, 
in  this  respect,  if  the  opinions  of  the  Executive  were  wise  and  salutary, 
the  institution  has  been  in  fault.  But  if,  instead  of  disobeying  these  in- 
structions, the  Bank  had  followed  them,  what  would  have  been  the  con- 
sequence ?  My  honorable  friend  from  Kentucky,  (Mr.  CLAY,)  with  his 
usual  clearness,  showed,  the  other  day,  that  if  the  Bank,  between  this  and 
the  termination  of  her  charter,  withdraws  all  the  notes  from  circulation, 
and  collects  her  debts,  she  must  call  in  about  two  millions  each  month 
from  the  community  ;  for  the  amount  she  has  to  collect  is  fifty-five  mil- 
lions, and  the  time  little  more  than  twenty-four  months.  Now,  sir,  if,  in 
obedience  to  the  mandate  of  the  Secretary,  the  Bank  had  commenced,  on 
the  1st  of  October  last,  the  gradual  curtailment  of  which  he  speaks,  and 
diminished  her  discounts  two  millions  a  month  since  that  time,  she  would 
have,  by  the  1st  of  March,  withdrawn  from  circulation  ten  millions  of 
dollars. 

If  she  had,  I  ask  if  there  is  any  man  here  who  can  look  steadily  on 
the  frightful  consequences  which  must  have  ensued.  If  the  commercial 
world  is  now  agonized  by  a  mere  derangement  of  the  currency,  in  what 
situation  would  it  be  placed,  if  to  that  derangement  there  were  added,  at 
this  moment,  the  effects  of  withdrawing  so  large  a  sum  from  circulation  ? 
Ruin,  in  its  worst  form,  must  have  fallen  on  the  larger  portion  of  the 
commercial  and  manufacturing  interests  of  the  country,  unless,  indeed, 
the  State  banks  had  suspended  specie  payments.  The  Bank  of  the 
United  States,  sir,  in  my  opinion,  has  won  a  strong  title  to  the  confidence 
of  the  people  by  her  conduct.  She  saw  the  crisis  that  was  approaching 
— she  knew  the  pressure  would  be  great ;  and  that,  keeping  strictly 
within  the  Executive  injunction  conveyed  to  her,  she  could  have  produced 
such  a  convulsion  as  would  have  compelled  her  adversaries  to  change 
their  conduct  towards  her.  But  she  preferred  to  the  gratifications  of  a 
triumph  over  them,  the  performance  of  her  duty.  And  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury,  who  is  known  to  be  a  virtuous  as  well  as  a  talented  man, 
must,  I  am  sure,  rejoice  that  the  country  was  saved  from  the  effects  of 
his  own  measures ;  though  that  salvation  was  effected  at  the  expense  of 
his  reputation  for  foresight,  and  a  knowledge  of  the  subject  he  was  hand- 
ling. Heavy  as  is  the  responsibility  which  weighs  upon  him  now,  it 
would  have  been  increased  tenfold  had  the  Bank  followed  his  instruc- 
tions. 

But,  sir,  though  the  work  of  curtailment  has  not  yet  commenced,  the 
hour  when  it  must  begin  is  rapidly  approaching,  if  indeed  it  has  not  al- 
ready arrived.  The  Bank  cannot  defer  much  longer  to  commence  the 
withdrawal  of  her  funds  from  circulation,  and  the  moment  she  does,  all 
the  evils  under  which  the  community  suffers,  will  be  aggravated  far  be- 


15 

yond  even  their  present  severity.  We  should  not  sit  here  with  our  arms 
folded,  and  see  so  much  calamity  about  to  fall  on  the  country,  without 
making  a  single  effort  to  avert  it.  It  is  the  part  of  wisdom,  as  well  as  of 
duty,  to  step  forwrard,  and  meet  the  danger  before  it  reaches  us.  I  have 
the  most  sincere  conviction  that,  unless  we  do  something,  and  speedily, 
the  capital  and  industry  of  the  country  are  about  to  receive  a  shock  from 
which  they  will  not  recover  for  years.  Sir,  I  am  one  of  those  who  think 
that  there  are  no  means  to  restore  confidence,  but  by  a  recharter  of  the 
Bank,  and  for  that  measure  I  am  prepared  to  vote.  Whenever  it  is  pre- 
sented for  our  consideration,  I  shall  give  it  my  support,  provided  certain 
modifications  can  be  obtained  in  the  present  charter,  which,  without  im- 
pairing its  utility,  will  remove  many  of  the  objections  which  grow  out  of 
an  honest  jealousy  of  its  power. 

In  making  this  remark,  I  am  not  to  be  understood  as  giving  MY  sanc- 
tion to  this  jealousy ;  but,  in  carrying  out  any  measure,  public  opinion, 
and  public  prejudice,  too,  should  be  consulted  and  gratified,  provided 
they  can  be  gratified  without  injury  to  the  true  interests  of  the  country. 
This  opinion  as  to  the  propriety  of  rechartering  the  Bank  renders  it 
almost  unnecessary  for  me  to  say  that  I  am  wholly  opposed  to  the  pro- 
position to  return  to  a  metallic  currency.  We  cannot  do  so,  if  we  wished, 
and,  if  we  could,  it  is  not  desirable.  If  the  question  was  now  proposed 
for  the  first  time,  what  kind  of  circulating  medium  we  should  adopt  for 
this  country,  I  should  hesitate  which  to  prefer — a  metallic  currency,  or 
a  mixed  one.  Each  has  its  advantages.  On  the  whole,  I  believe  the 
latter  is  best  adapted  to  the  wants  and  interests  of  a  country  so  decidedly 
commercial,  and  so  rapidly  increasing  as  ours.  But  in  our  present  situa- 
tion, with  the  habits  of  society  formed  to  the  use  of  paper  money,  and 
with  innumerable  contracts  existing,  which  have  been  enteied  into  on 
long  credits,  in  relation  to  the  value  given  to  real  estate  by  this  species 
of  money,  so  complete  a  change  in  our  circulating  medium  would  work 
great  injustice.  If  the  quantity  of  gold  and  silver  necessary  for  the  wants 
of  this  country  be,  as  I  heard  it  estimated,  and  I  think  correctly,  80  mil- 
lions of  dollars,  and  we  have  now  about  25  or  30  millions  in  the  United 
States,  we  must  go  into  market  to  procure  the  difference  between  these 
two  sums.  An  immediate  demand  for  so  large  an  amount  would  greatly 
raise  the  value  of  specie,  both  in  Europe  and  America ;  and,  as  a  con- 
sequence, so  depress  the  value  of  all  property,  as  to  prove  ruinous  to 
thousands.  I  do  not  see  any  advantages  in  a  metallic  currency,  to  induce 
me  to  pay  so  dearly  for  it.  Nor  is  it  unworthy  of  consideration,  that  a 
well  regulated  paper  currency  enables  us  to  employ  all  the  capital  repre- 
sented by  that  paper,  beyond  the  specie  in  the  vaults  of  the  banks,  in 
other  and  useful  purposes,  and  which,  if  we  had  not  paper  money,  would 
be  sunk  in  the  purchase  of  a  circulating  medium.  There  are  many  other 
considerations  belonging  to  this  part  of  the  subject,  which  an  unwilling- 
ness to  trespass  on  the  time  of  the  Senate  forbids  me  to  enter  into,  more 
especially  as  all  speculations  in  regard  to  it  are  fruitless  in  this  country. 

For,  if  we  wished  to  return  to  a  metallic  currency,  we  have  not  the 
power  to  do  so.  We  have  no  means  of  compelling  the  States  to  resort 
to  it.  They  will  charter  as  many  banks  as  they  please  ;  and  there  are  so 
many  of  the  strongest  passions  of  our  nature  at  work  to  create  them,  that 
there  will  be  always  more  of  them  than  there  should  be.  Your  refusal 


16 

to  take  their  notes  at  your  custom-houses  and  land  offices,  may  check 
the  circulation  of  their  paper  on  the  seaboard  and  extreme  West,  but  in 
the  much  larger  portion  of  the  United  States  they  will  disregard  such  a 
measure,  because  bank  notes  are  not  wanted  in  it  for  either  purpose.  Sir, 
it  is  easy  to  see  the  state  to  which  we  are  approaching.  So  soon  as  the 
National  Bank,  the  great  controller  and  regulator  of  the  State  banks,  is 
Withdrawn,  we  shall  have  from  four  to  five  hundred  of  these  institutions, 
all  of  them  trying  to  make  as  large  dividends  as  possible,  and  using  every 
effort  to  flood  their  respective  neighborhoods  with  their  own  paper.  Gen- 
tlemen say  that  the  liability  of  the  Bank  to  demands  for  specie  for  their 
notes  will  operate  as  a  check  on  excessive  issues.  It  will  no  doubt  do 
so  wrhen  the  direction  is  prudent  and  wise  ;  but  experience  has  proved  it 
is  not  a  sufficient  restraint  to  the  greater  number  of  these  institutions. 
The  truth  is,  that  the  liability  of  a  bank  for  specie  is  merely  nominal,  un- 
less apprehension  exists  as  to  its  solvency.  At  other  times,  save  under 
circumstances  so  peculiar  as  to  forbid  us  to  deduce  any  general  rule  from 
them,  it  is  scarcely  asked  for  in  large  quantities.  No,  sir,  these  banks 
will  do  as  all  others  have  done,  circumstanced  like  them  ;  they  will  issue 
as  much  paper  as  they  can  ;  they  will  make  as  large  dividends  as  they 
can  ;  they  will  forget  and  contemn  the  distant  danger  ;  and  they  will  profit 
by  what  they  consider  the  present  advantage.  It  is  in  human  nature  they 
should  do  so.  It  is  our  experience  they  have  done  so.  Such  has  been 
their  course  in  England,  in  Scotland,  and  in  the  United  States.  When- 
ever the  salutary  influence  of  a  controlling  institution  has  been  withdrawn 
from  them,  they  have  issued  too  much  paper,  and  deranged  the  currency 
of  the  country. 

But  gentlemen  say  it  is  an  experiment  wre  are  making ;  and,  if  that 
experiment  fails,  we  can  then  resort  to  a  National  Bank.  Sir,  admitting 
it  to  be  an  experiment,  1  see  no  wisdom  in  making  it.  If  our  situation 
under  the  regular  influence  of  the  United  States  Bank  had  been  one  of 
misfortune  ;  if,  before  the  late  measures,  our  currency  had  been  vitiated, 
and  the  Bank  had  failed  to  perform  the  other  purposes  for  which  it  was 
created,  then  I  admit  there  might  be  some  excuse  for  making  an  experi- 
ment. But  to  choose  a  time  when  our  currency  was  sound ;  when  the 
fiscal  affairs  of  the  Government  were  faithfully  conducted,  and  all  the 
different  classes  of  society  enjoyed  the  fruits  of  their  industry  ;  and  pros- 
perity was  seen  in  every  form  by  which  the  advance  of  society  in  wealth 
and  comfort  could  be  marked — to  choose  such  a  moment  as  that,  I  say,  to 
make  an  experiment,  by  which  we  might  be  made  a  great  deal  worse,  and 
could  not  be  made  better,  may  be  a  very  wise  measure  in  the  Govern- 
ment ;  but  if  an  individual  were  so  to  act  in  the  management  of  his  pri- 
vate affairs,  I  should  think  doubts  might  be  reasonably  entertained  of  his 
sanity. 

But,  sir,  this  talk  about  an  experiment  is  a  mere  delusion.  I  warn  the 
American  people  not  to  be  deceived  by  it.  There  is  no  experiment  to  be 
made.  The  experiment  was  tried  twenty  years  ago,  and  it  failed,  sig- 
nally failed.  It  would  seem  that  we  had  forgotten,  or  were  unwilling  to 
take  lessons  from  the  past.  Wlien  the  charter  of  the  first  National  Bank 
was  about  expiring,  an  application  was  made  to  renew  it.  The  same 
.opposition  was  made  to  it  that  we  hear  now  offered  against  the  present 
institution  ;  and  there  are  to  be  found,  in  the  attacks  of  its  opponents,  the 


1  j 

same  general  denunciations  ;  the  same  resort  to  prejudice ;  the  same 
lankness  of  argument,  and  failure  of  proof — the  capital  was  foreign  ;  its 
directors  were  of  the  party  not  in  power ;  it  had  meddled  in  elections  ; 
it  was  dangerous  to  our  liberties ;  it  was  a  mammoth  of  corruption.  Not 
one  scintilla  of  proof  do  I  find  in  the  debates  of  that  day,  in  support  of 
these  charges,  but  the  accusation  struck  in  with  popular  prejudice,  and 
the  Bank  was  destroyed.  Yes,  sir,  it  was  destroyed  ;  and  dearly  did  the 
American  people  pay  for  the  errors  of  their  politicians.  The  whole  cur- 
rency of  the  country  immediately  fell  into  such  confusion,  that  no  man 
could  tell  what  was  the  value  of  his  property  ;  and,  after  years  of  disaster 
and  distress,  a  bank,  by  the  voice  of  a  large  majority  of  the  people,  was 
erected  in  the  place  of  that  which  had  been  demolished.  Then,  too,  sir, 
was  taught  a  lesson,  which  I  should  have  thought  never  would  have  been 
forgotten.  The  men  who  had  been  principally  instrumental  in  putting 
down  the  first  bank,  were  compelled,  by  what  passed  before  their  eyes, 
to  come  forward  and  acknowledge  their  errors,  and  assist  in  repairing 
them  by  the  creation  of  a  new  bank.  And  do  gentlemen,  in  the  face  of 
this  recent  and  striking  example,  still  say  that  the  experiment  is  yet  to  be 
made  ? 

Sir,  I  predict  that  after  the  currency  of  the  country  is  deranged,  and 
confusion  and  distress  pervade  all  the  land,  we  shall  see  the  very  men, 
now  engaged  in  preventing  the  recharter  of  this  bank,  if  they  should  suc- 
ceed, forced  to  come  forward,  and  endeavor  to  have  a  similar  one  char- 
tered. To  these  men  I  say,  do  now,  with  a  good  grace,  what  you  will 
finally  be  compelled  to  do.  Do  it  before  your  country  suffers  at  every 
pore — before  you  have  ruined  the  hopes  and  broken  the  fortunes  of  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  !  This  is  a  question  in  which  your  patriotism  can,  and 
ought,  to  soar  above  party  considerations.  If  the  President  of  the  United 
States  has  committed  an  error,  and  you  refuse  to  correct  it,  do  you  not 
enable  your  adversaries  to  say  that  in  your  opinion  the  President  has  not 
other  and  sufficient  merits  to  permit  you  to  acknowledge  one  mistake 
made  by  him  ?  Sir,  I  trust  better  counsels  will  prevail ;  and  that,  before 
Congress  adjourns,  casting  aside  party  spirit,  some  measure  will  be  de- 
vised, by  our  united  deliberations,  which  will  withdraw  the  country  in 
safety  from  the  perilous  position  in  which  it  is  now  placed. 


* 


